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MAYHEW V. HICKOX: BALANCING MAINE’S 
PUBLIC’S HEALTH WITH PERSONAL LIBERTIES 
DURING THE EBOLA “CRISIS” 
Benjamin W. Dexter* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
By the 1960s, methods in the detection and treatment (and consequently 
improvements in the survival rates) of infectious diseases had advanced so 
significantly that “[d]iseases seemed destined to all but disappear.”1  But the re-
emergence of previously “eradicated” diseases, and the emergence of new diseases 
that seemed all-but-untreatable, such as Ebola virus, soon put to rest the euphoria 
of medical advancement.2 
Ebola virus is one of the most dangerous infectious diseases to emerge in the 
twentieth century,3 and through media sources, including movies, television shows, 
and news reporting, has become one of the most feared.4  Despite public 
misunderstanding regarding the causes, symptoms, and treatment of the virus, and 
some political exaggeration of the dangers, these fears are not without merit, as 
Ebola virus is life-threatening and difficult to diagnose.5  The disease is a real and 
recurring threat to public safety, especially in particular African countries: the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has said that the 2014 Ebola epidemic is the 
largest Ebola epidemic in history.6 
Ebola poses a very difficult public health problem partly because there is no 
known cure.7  Though oral or intravenous rehydration and symptom-specific 
treatment improves the infected individual’s chances for survival, the disease has a 
very low survival rate.8  It is also extremely infectious, and while primarily spread 
through contact with blood or bodily fluids, has been known to infect through skin-
to-skin contact.9  Thus, the only sure method to prevent the spread of the disease is 
to prevent exposure through direct contact with infected individuals.10 
                                                                                                     
 * Student author. 
 1.  David Heymann, Foreword to TARA C. SMITH, EBOLA 6 (Tara Koellhoffer et al. eds., 2006). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  TARA C. SMITH, EBOLA 8 (Tara Koellhoffer et al. eds., 2006) (“Much like the Black Plague or 
AIDS, Ebola is a disease that has transcended medicine to become a part of popular culture.  And also 
like AIDS, the Ebola virus has captured the general public’s respect and instilled fear in a remarkably 
short period of time . . . .”). 
 5.  Id. at 36 (“Because these symptoms are common to many diseases, it is very difficult to make a 
definitive diagnosis of Ebola infection at [early stages].  As the disease progresses, bloody diarrhea, a 
severe sore throat, and jaundice . . . are common symptoms.”). 
 6.  Ebola, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/ 
index.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2015). 
 7.  Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/ 
fs103/en/ (last updated Sept. 2014). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  SMITH, supra note 4, at 41-42. 
 10.  See id. 
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For these reasons—difficulty of treatment and extreme virulence—the CDC 
has established guidelines for states to follow in order to prevent the spread of 
Ebola in the United States.11  In Maine, these guidelines have been adopted by the 
Maine Center for Disease Control and Prevention (MCDC), operating under the 
Maine Department of Health and Human Services.12  Unfortunately, these 
guidelines come into conflict with personal liberties, and although the courts have 
long supported states’ rights through the police powers to mandate certain extreme 
measures against persons posing a public health risk,13 the state’s power is 
sometimes challenged in court. 
Most recently, Maine’s ability to impose travel, personal proximity, and 
person-to-person contact restrictions on a citizen of this state was challenged when 
a nurse, Kaci Hickox, who had been treating Ebola-infected patients in African 
countries returned home to Fort Kent after completing her work with Doctors 
Without Borders.14  Though initially indicating that she would comply with MCDC 
requests as to isolating herself in her home and submitting to daily medical status 
monitoring, Hickox made a stir when she publicly spoke out against the 
restrictions.15  The State filed a petition to limit Hickox’s movement and activities, 
using CDC guidelines as the basis for restrictions.16  Though a Temporary Order 
was granted by the  Maine District Court (Fort Kent, Chief Judge LaVerdiere 
presiding), Hickox fought the Petition, and an Order Pending Hearing was granted, 
which removed many of the restrictions imposed by the Temporary Order and 
maintained only a few of the State’s requested impositions.17  Amid public outcry 
that spanned the state, indeed the nation, Hickox ultimately agreed to abide by the 
lesser restrictions for the entirety of the requested time period.18 
                                                                                                     
 11.  See What You Need to Know About Ebola, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/what-need-to-know-ebola.pdf (last updated Apr. 28, 2015); 
Preparing for Ebola – A Tiered Approach, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/preparing/index.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2015); Interim 
U.S. Guidance for Monitoring and Movement of Persons with Potential Ebola Virus Exposure, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/exposure/monitoring-and-
movement-of-persons-with-exposure.html [hereinafter CDC Guidance] (last updated May 13, 2015). 
 12.  See Ebola: Information for Healthcare Workers and First Responders, ME. CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/infectious-disease/epi/zoonotic/ebola/ 
providers.shtml? (last visited Sept. 4, 2015); see also Maine CDC Adopted Rules, ME. CTR. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/maine-cdc-rules.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
 13.  See, e.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 175 (1922) (holding that public officials could exclude a 
child from a public school “because she did not have the required certificate [of vaccination] and refused 
to submit to vaccination.”). 
 14.  Julia Bayly, Nurse Kaci Hickox Speaks at Fort Kent Home, Vows to fight 21-Day Isolation, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014, 8:35 AM), http://bangordailynews.com/2014/10/29/news/ 
aroostook/kaci-hickox-back-in-fort-kent-vows-to-fight-21-day-isolation/. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Verified Petition for Public Health Order at 5-6, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me. 
Dist. Ct., Fort Kent, Oct. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Petition].   
 17.  Order Pending Hearing at 3, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me. Dist. Ct., Fort Kent, 
Oct. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Order Pending Hearing].   
 18.  Judy Harrison, Kaci Hickox, State Agree to Make Temporary Order Permanent; Hearings This 
Week Cancelled, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 3, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://bangordailynews.com/ 
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Part II of this case note provides background information about the Ebola 
virus—etiology, pathology, symptoms, and treatment—and delineates the history 
of the Ebola “crisis” and the current West African outbreak.  Part III then addresses 
public health law in the U.S. and in Maine, including relevant case law, the state 
delegation of public health authority, and available mechanisms for imposing 
restrictions on potentially infected individuals.  In Part IV, this note discusses in 
greater detail the Kaci Hickox case, describing her very public court struggle 
against state-imposed quarantine.19  Part IV further discusses the outcome of the 
state petition to quarantine Hickox, and the resulting court order.  Finally, Part V 
analyzes the court’s decision in light of the statutory public health provisions, and 
argues first that the court could have taken further measures in restricting Hickox’s 
liberty during the short incubation period of Ebola, and next that the standard of 
proof required to establish the necessity of quarantine is too high to provide 
adequately for public safety. 
II.  EBOLA 
A.  The Disease  
Ebola hemorrhagic fever, commonly known as Ebola virus or simply Ebola,20 
is an acute illness caused by a virus in the family Filoviridae.21  Five species have 
been identified, of which  Zaire ebolavirus is responsible for modern outbreaks in 
West Africa.22  Fruit bats are the natural hosts,23 though it has been suggested that 
primates are a more likely source of transmission to humans.24   Human-to-human 
transmission occurs via direct contact with blood, secretions, organs, or other 
bodily fluids; or from direct contact with materials that have been contaminated 
with such fluids.25  Skin-to-skin contact is less likely to cause infection, but contact 
between these fluids and broken skin or mucous membranes can result in 
transmission of the virus, particularly through the eyes, nose, and mouth.26 
Once transmission has occurred, the virus has an incubation period of up to 21 
days, meaning that the time from exposure resulting in infection until the onset of 
                                                                                                     
2014/11/03/news/aroostook/kaci-hickox-state-agree-to-make-temporary-order-permanent-hearings-this-
week-canceled/. 
 19.  See CDC Guidance, supra note 11.  The CDC seems to distinguish “quarantine” from 
“isolation” and other quarantine-like safety measures, but the only distinguishing factor is that 
quarantine is defined as the isolation of a person “who is not yet ill.”  In all other respects – primarily 
separation of the individual from the general population – quarantine is identical to isolation as defined 
by the CDC.  Therefore, I use the terms interchangeably throughout this case note to mean the 
separation of a potentially infected individual from the general public to prevent the spread of a 
communicable disease. 
 20.  Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 7 (Ebola was named for the Ebola River, which bordered the 
village on the Congo in which the first recognized instances of the disease occurred). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  SMITH, supra note 4, at 41. 
 25.  Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 7. 
 26.  SMITH, supra note 4, at 42. 
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symptoms can be between two and 21 days.27  Infected individuals are not 
themselves contagious until symptoms appear.28  The first symptoms typically 
include sudden fever, fatigue, muscle pain, headache, and sore throat, which are 
often mistaken for symptoms of other diseases, such as malaria.29  Secondary 
symptoms indicate progression of the virus and extreme danger to the infected 
individual: vomiting, diarrhea, rashes, impaired organ function, and internal and 
external hemorrhaging.30   
After a patient presents with symptoms, doctors seek to rule out infection by 
other diseases using methods such as electron microscopy and virus isolation by 
cell culture.31  Testing is difficult because there are associated isolation protocols 
for any test samples, and all testing ought to be done “under maximum biological 
containment conditions.”32  Because not every hospital is equipped to perform 
necessary testing under adequate safety protocols, the CDC has developed stringent 
guidelines as to the transportation and handling of samples for Ebola testing.33  
There is no known cure, though oral or intravenous rehydration and symptom-
specific treatment improves the infected individual’s chances for survival.34  
Fatality rates of past outbreaks have varied from 25 percent to 90 percent, and 
average around 50 percent.35  One researcher has said that “[w]ith the exception of 
AIDS, no known virus kills with the effectiveness that Ebola does.”36 
B.  A History of Outbreaks 
The first known outbreaks of the Ebola virus occurred in the Sudan and 
Democratic Republic of Congo.37  During those outbreaks, there were a total of 602 
known cases, and a total of 331 known deaths due to the virus.38  Since 1976, there 
have been many cases of Ebola emerging in other African countries, including 
Uganda, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali.39  Several contaminations have 
                                                                                                     
 27.  Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 7.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id., see also SMITH, supra note 4, at 36. 
 31.  Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 7.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Guidance for Collection, Transport and Submission of Specimens for Ebola Virus Testing, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-
us/laboratories/specimens.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2015). 
 34.  Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 7.  
 35.  Id. 
 36.  SMITH, supra note 4, at 15.  Smith notes that, at the time of her book’s publication in 2006, 
Ebola had “caused fewer than 2,000 total human infections, resulting in approximately 1,100 deaths.”  
For this reason, she “cannot help but wonder why Ebola has received a reputation as a terrible killer.”  
However, updated statistics indicate a much higher total number of infected individuals, and a much 
higher death toll due to the disease.  See infra note 42. 
 37.  Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 7. 
 38.  Cases of Ebola Virus Disease in Africa, 1976-2014, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/distribution-map.html (last updated Feb. 
6, 2015). 
 39.  Outbreak Distribution Map, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/distribution-map.html#areas (last updated 
Feb. 6, 2015). 
268 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
occurred in other countries, including England and Russia, however, these 
contaminations were contained to laboratories and did not result in any ex-
laboratory infections.40   
C.  The Current Outbreak 
During the period from 1977 to 2013, no more than 425 cases in a single year 
were confirmed, and no more than 250 deaths per year were attributed to the 
virus.41  However, in 2014, significant numbers of individuals became infected, 
leading to more than 22,500 reported cases with more than 9,000 reported deaths 
due to the virus, impacting the countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea most 
intensely.42  To date, the current West African Ebola outbreak is the largest in 
history, both by number of infected persons and number of deaths due to 
infection.43   
There has been a promising response to the outbreak, at least on an 
international level: August 8, 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared the West African Ebola virus outbreak to be a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern, calling it an “extraordinary event,” and recommending 
that all countries provide “accurate and relevant information on the Ebola outbreak 
and measures to reduce the risk of exposure,” as well as advising countries to 
prepare “to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g. health 
workers) who have been exposed to Ebola.”44   There was some criticism of the 
WHO’s response, particularly of the African regional office’s limited staffing in 
those countries most impacted by Ebola.45  But after several nations in West Africa 
declared states of emergency,46 other international aid organizations led medical 
responses in the area, such as Doctors Without Borders, which as of the writing of 
this Note employs more than 90 international and 1,700 local staff to assist West 
African nations affected by the outbreak.47  
The United States has not been unaffected by the Ebola epidemic in Africa.  In 
September and October 2014 there were four cases of Ebola infection diagnosed 
                                                                                                     
 40.  Known Cases and Outbreaks of Ebola Virus Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/chronology.html (last updated Feb. 6, 
2015). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Outbreak Distribution Map, supra note 39. 
 43.  Ebola, supra note 6. 
 44.  Statement on 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in 
West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-
20140808/en/ (Aug. 8, 2014). 
 45.  World Health Organisation: Too Big to Ail, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 13, 2014) 
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21636038-ebola-has-laid-bare-failings-worlds-health-
authority-too-big-ail.  This article further notes that WHO may not be to blame, as private voluntary 
donations now account for 80% of the WHO’s funding, which has dropped 20% since 2011.  Id. 
 46.  James G. Hodge, Jr., et al., Global Emergency Responses to the 2014 Ebola Outbreak, 42 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 595, 595 (2014). 
 47.  Ebola, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/our-
work/medical-issues/ebola (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
2016] MAYHEW V. HICKOX 269 
within the United States.48  In September, a man traveling by plane from Liberia to 
the United States was diagnosed in Texas after developing symptoms, and 
consequently infected two healthcare workers who had provided him medical 
treatment at Texas Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas.49  The patient died from his 
disease, but both healthcare workers recovered.50  In October, a medical aid worker 
from Doctors Without Borders who returned from Guinea to New York City was 
diagnosed with Ebola; the worker later recovered and was discharged on November 
11th from Bellevue Hospital.51  By mid-November 2014, of a total of ten Ebola 
virus patients in the United States, two had died from the virus.52 
The general public response—from governmental and media sources—in the 
United States has been a chimera of misinformation and shoot-before-you-ask 
proclamations.53  Although the CDC developed guidelines for just about every 
scenario imaginable,54 and put together easy-to-use brochures to disseminate 
information about Ebola, these resources were primarily made available to the 
public online.55  Politicians did little to assuage public fears, some calling for 
complete bans on travel to and from West African countries affected by the Ebola 
outbreak.56  Others called for mandatory quarantine facilities at airports to screen 
and detain travelers arriving from Ebola-affected countries.57  And although the 
CDC information was widely available to state Departments of Health and Human 
Services, by October of 2014, New York and New Jersey had announced 
mandatory quarantine protocols for returning health care workers with direct Ebola 
exposure, “an action that many believed was overreaching and one that would deter 
some health workers from traveling to West Africa to help Ebola victims.”58 
The information that the CDC disseminated to various state departments of 
health and to state CDC satellites included information about the disease itself, as 
well as information about how to prevent the spread of the disease through a 
                                                                                                     
 48.  Cases of Ebola Diagnosed in the United States, CTRS.  FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/united-states-imported-
case.html (last updated Dec. 16, 2014). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id.  (showing that before diagnosis, the second healthcare worker had traveled by plane to 
Atlanta, Georgia, and all passengers and crew were found, alerted, and underwent CDC monitoring). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Martha Middleton, The Law of Ebola, 101-JAN A.B.A. J. 88, 89 (2015). 
 53.  It has been said that “Ebola is not the first epidemic to catch the world off-guard. Advances in 
vaccines and antibiotics in the 20th century led some health experts to discount the threat of infectious 
disease.”  Ebola: Fever Rising, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 16, 2014) http://www.economist.com/news/ 
international/21612157-spread-ebola-west-africa-deeply-troubling-region-and-world-fever.  
Nonetheless, every developed country in the world has had more than 40 years to design and implement 
Ebola responses and to spread accurate information about the disease, so it is disheartening to the 
Author of this Note to consider what the responses might be to another, deadlier, disease.   
 54.  See CDC Guidance, supra note 19. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Lauren French, Boehner to Obama: Ban Travel for Ebola, POLITICO (Oct. 15, 2014, 6:58 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/10/john-boehner-obama-flights-ebola-111924.html. 
 57.  Cristina Marcos, Texas Republican Calls for Ebola Quarantine Facility at Dallas Airport, THE 
HILL (Oct. 15, 2014, 5:02 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/220866-texas-republican-
calls-for-ebola-quarantine-facility-at-dallas. 
 58.  MIDDLETON, supra note 52, at 94. 
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variety of public and individualized health measures.59  The CDC divided Ebola 
exposure into five risk categories, ranging from symptomatic individuals with high 
risk, to individuals with no identifiable risk.60  Quarantine or full isolation was 
recommended for any individual displaying symptoms of Ebola, consistent with the 
extremely virulent nature of the disease and the method of transmission via bodily 
fluids.61  In categories of lesser risk or for asymptomatic individuals, the CDC 
recommended “direct active monitoring,” which includes daily reporting of 
measured temperature and symptoms to a public health authority, and discussion 
with a public health authority of plans to work, travel, take public transportation, 
etc.62  The CDC also recommended varying degrees of isolation and controlled 
movement (limits on means of travel) based on which lesser risk category applied 
to the exposed individual.63  These recommendations remain in effect to this day, 
and are often updated based on new best practices and risk factors.64 
III.  THE INTERSECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVATE RIGHTS 
A.  Historical Court Treatment of Public Health Measures 
Quarantine has been recognized as a valid use of police powers since at least 
the early 20th century.  In one early case, Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a 
Vapeur v. Louisiana Board of Health,65 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of whether a public health board, acting under authority of the state, could forbid a 
ship from landing in a town or city under quarantine for communicable disease.66  
In that case, even though the plaintiff argued that the public health board had 
enforced the quarantine restriction against only that particular ship, the restriction 
was a valid exercise of police powers.67  The Court upheld the power of the state to 
enact laws giving various municipalities the power to quarantine in order to protect 
public health.68  The Court noted that until Congress creates federal quarantine 
laws under a power such as the Commerce Clause,69  state quarantine laws survive 
a constitutional challenge.70 
While Compagnie Francaise dealt with a state’s power to quarantine in order 
to prevent entry of individuals to at-risk areas, a state’s power over individuals who 
create a public health risk has also been upheld.  In the seminal public health law 
                                                                                                     
 59.  See CDC Guidance, supra note 19. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id.   
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  186 U.S. 380 (1902). 
 66.  Id. at 380. 
 67.  Id. at 384. 
 68.  Id. at 388. 
 69.  As far as the Commerce Clause relates to quarantine: A state “action is not necessarily invalid 
because it may affect commerce with foreign nations or among the states, but it may not unnecessarily 
interfere with such commerce, and it cannot, under the pretense of adopting health regulations laws, 
regulate or prohibit commerce in a way, or to an extent, not required for the preservation or promotion 
of public health.”  39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 2 (2015).  
 70.  Compagnie Francaise, 186 U.S. at 388. 
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case Jacobsen v. Massachusetts,71 a Commonwealth of Massachusetts law allowed 
boards of health of cities throughout Massachusetts to require vaccination and 
revaccination of citizens, “if necessary for the public health or safety,” and 
instituted a five-dollar fine for noncompliance.72  Subsequently, the board of health 
of Cambridge, Massachusetts established a regulation requiring all citizens to 
receive the smallpox vaccine.73  Jacobsen refused to comply, and was arraigned; he 
plead not guilty, and appealed his jury conviction.74   
Unlike the arguments put forth in Compagnie Francaise, which were grounded 
in federalism, Jacobsen argued that the law invaded his personal liberty “to care for 
his own body and health in such a way as to him seems best.”75  The Supreme 
Court reasoned that “liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted 
license to act according to one’s own will,” and held that the vaccination statute 
was a valid exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth; therefore, the 
Cambridge ordinance was also valid.76  However, the Court made clear that it 
would not allow a state to go so far as to intervene in an individual’s medical care, 
cautioning that there may arrive cases “so arbitrary and oppressive . . . as to justify 
the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression.”77 The Court did 
not explicitly define its limitations on state intervention.78 
Various states have similarly upheld the police power to quarantine when 
necessary for public health.  For example, the Supreme Court of Washington held 
that a patient may be confined and forced to comply with treatment when necessary 
for public health.79  In In re Washington, a patient diagnosed with pulmonary 
tuberculosis did not comply with medical advice regarding treatment and personal 
confinement, and was arrested after failing to follow a court order regarding her 
treatment regimen.80  The court noted, “[t]his country has long recognized that the 
Constitution does not bar enforced quarantine.”81  Therefore a court order forcing 
confinement and treatment was upheld.82 
In sum, state laws that allow for the restriction of individual rights in favor of 
public health have been broadly upheld over a variety of challenges: 
Power to make quarantine regulations is one of the most frequent powers 
conferred on boards of health.  Such regulations constitute a proper exercise of the 
police power, provided they do not abridge rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The federal constitution does not bar enforced quarantine.83 
                                                                                                     
 71.  197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). 
 72.  Id. at 12. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 13. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 28, 39. 
 77.  Id. at 38. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  In re Washington, 716 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d in part, disapproved in part 
on other grounds, 735 N.W.2d 111 (Wis. 2007). 
 80.  Id. at 179. 
 81.  Id. at 182. 
 82.  Id. at 184. 
 83.  39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 60 (2015) (internal citations omitted). 
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Challenges to quarantine in the modern day are therefore few and far between.  
The dearth of such challenges could be a reflection on the control modern science 
has over diseases, such as influenza or smallpox, which once led entire cities to 
strictly enforce vaccinations.84  Or, it could reflect broad recognition that 
confinement of individuals for public health or safety falls under traditional police 
powers.85  Likely, it is a function of both. 
B.  Varying Jurisdictional Approaches 
States tend to differ in the mechanisms by which they confer power to enforce 
public health measures.  “In this country, states have the broadest legal authority to 
investigate and control public health outbreaks and protect the safety of citizens 
under their general police power.”86  Each state has a Department of Health or 
Health and Human Services, which is usually vested with the responsibility of 
protecting the “health, safety and well-being of [its] citizens.”87  What differs is 
how the powers of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) are 
divested to other entities within the state. 
Some states invest the same authority in county boards of health and health 
departments as they grant to the state-level Department of Health. 88  Arizona, for 
example, follows this model.89  The result is similar to that in Jacobsen, allowing 
individual boards of health (e.g., for a county or town) to establish enforceable 
ordinances that require specific actions in support of public health.90  Yet even 
where a state statute provides that “any city, town, or village [may] adopt and 
enforce additional local law, ordinances, or regulations” concerning public health, a 
county health board cannot exceed its authority as an administrative agency by 
usurping legislative functions.91  
In other states, the “public health and safety laws contemplate a 
comprehensive state health planning system” in which the state DHHS takes the 
reins, or county or municipal authorities, and boards of health simply direct or 
provide services to the public.92  Michigan is one state that follows this model.93  In 
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quotations omitted)). 
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these states, only DHHS may create policy, but town boards of health are in place 
to implement it.94  When reviewing rules implemented by boards of health in such 
jurisdictions, courts will frequently address whether the rule is related to the 
promotion of public health, is not discriminatory, and is reasonable in light of the 
health risk addressed.95  And “[a]lthough a legislative body arguably may direct 
that distinctions be based on factors other than public health when authorizing 
promulgation of rules by health boards,” a health board cannot invent or establish 
new factors on its own accord.96  Thus, either the DHHS or the legislative body 
itself must designate public health policy in such jurisdictions. 
C.  Maine’s Approach to Public Health 
Maine follows the second, top-down approach—the legislature has tasked the 
DHHS with creating and implementing rules regarding public health policy in 
Maine.97  Unlike the states following the first approach, public boards of health in 
Maine do not have the authority to establish policies for dealing with public health 
emergencies.98  In fact, this power lies only with DHHS: “In the event of an actual 
or threatened epidemic or public health threat, the department may declare that a 
health emergency exists and may adopt emergency rules for the protection of 
public health.”99  The power is broad.  Adopted rules may include procedures 
regarding contaminated property, the establishment of treatment facilities, and, 
most relevant to health care workers exposed to Ebola virus, “procedures for the 
isolation and placement of infected persons for the purposes of care and treatment 
or infection control”—quarantine procedures.100 
When DHHS has cause to believe that an individual has a communicable 
disease requiring isolation, the department must follow very specific procedures 
established by Maine statute to force the infected person into treatment or any 
degree of isolation.  DHHS may petition the District Court for an order directing 
examination of a potentially infected person,101 or obtain an order from the District 
or Superior Court providing for comprehensive medical assessment, monitoring 
measures, or part or full-time monitoring.102  Before a full hearing is held on the 
petition, and upon a showing via affidavit that by clear and convincing evidence the 
                                                                                                     
 94.  Id. at 288. 
 95.  See, e.g., City of Roanoke Rapids v. Peedin, 478 S.E.2d 528, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) 
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 99.  Id. § 802(2). 
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 102.  Id. § 812. 
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individual “requires immediate custody in order to avoid a clear and immediate 
public health threat,” the court may grant temporary custody of the individual.103  
The court thus has the discretion to grant temporary custody.104  After the hearing 
on the petition, however, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
the infected person poses a public health threat, “the court shall issue the requested 
order” using the least restrictive measures necessary to “effectively protect the 
public health.”105  Therefore when the court finds that a public health threat exists, 
it must direct any measures that would be required to protect the public safety.106   
Under this scheme, the DHHS thus has the authority to request of the District 
or Superior Court that an individual posing a public health threat be placed under 
custody until the risk has passed.  The court may grant, as a preliminary matter, any 
of the requested measures it finds immediately necessary to protect public health, 
and later, after hearing on the petition, must grant the order using the least 
restrictive measures necessary if the threat is shown by clear and convincing 
evidence.107  It was under this statutory device that the State in Mayhew v. Hickox 
sought to detain and monitor Kaci Hickox while she posed a risk of developing 
Ebola virus symptoms. 
IV.  MAYHEW V. HICKOX 
A.  Background 
Kaci Hickox is a nurse who spent significant time in Sierra Leone as a nurse 
for Doctors Without Borders treating patients infected with the Ebola virus.108  In 
October of 2014 she returned to the United States and was placed under mandatory 
quarantine in New Jersey.109  New Jersey’s health protocols were more stringent 
than CDC recommendations, and included: immediately transporting the patient to 
a “Tier 2” hospital for evaluation by emergency medical services personnel 
wearing personal protective equipment (in the case of Ebola patients, head-to-toe 
sealed hazmat suits); prohibiting the patient’s movement; contacting the patient’s 
local health department for active monitoring for 21 days; and “conditional release 
based upon a person’s compliance and adherence to local health department’s 
instructions.”110 Hickox was immediately outspoken and highly critical of her 
treatment at the hands of New Jersey health officials, claiming that it was 
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unnecessary and that her “basic human rights [had] been violated.”111  During her 
New Jersey quarantine she twice tested negative for Ebola.112 
Hickox was allowed to travel back to Maine after she showed no symptoms 
under New Jersey quarantine for a full 24 hours.113  New Jersey provided private 
transportation and Hickox had no contact with members of the general public 
during the trip back to Maine.114  At the time, her boyfriend, Ted Wilbur, a nursing 
student at the University of Maine, indicated to the press that Hickox intended to 
comply with any Maine CDC policies, including the 21-day quarantine.115  
Although Maine public officials did not provide specific information, MCDC 
released a statement indicating that “all known travelers returning from West 
Africa to Maine [were] cooperating with State health officials.”116   
Unfortunately, after her return to Fort Kent, the situation became one of 
Maine’s most memorable public spectacles of the year.  Hickox vowed to fight the 
quarantine: “I am not going to sit around and be bullied by politicians and forced to 
stay in my home when I am not a risk to the American public.”117  Despite 
admonition from MCDC and a general public outcry, she went so far as to take a 
bike ride with Wilbur on the morning of October 30th.118  Even reporters who 
lauded her desire to challenge the quarantine had mixed feelings about “whether 
Hickox’s bike ride was a wise and principled move, or an unnecessary 
provocation.”119 
B.  The Public Health Order Petition and Disposition 
The State soon filed a petition to limit Hickox’s movement, activities, and 
exposure to the public, as well as to maintain CDC monitoring.120  In toto, the 
State’s petition requested: 
a. Direct Active Monitoring;  
b. Any travel will be coordinated with the public health authorities to ensure 
uninterrupted direct active monitoring; 
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 112.  Id. 
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c. Controlled movement to include exclusion from long-distance commercial 
conveyances or local public conveyances;  
d. Exclusion from public places and congregate gatherings;  
e. Exclusion from workplaces for the duration of a public health order (except to 
receive necessary healthcare);  
f. Non-congregate public activities while maintaining a 3-foot distance from others 
is permitted (i.e., walking or jogging in a park);  
g. Other activities should be assessed as needs and circumstances change to 
determine whether these activities may be undertaken;  
h. The Respondent will not leave the municipality of Fort Kent without direct 
consultation with public health authorities; and  
i. Federal public health travel restrictions may be implemented based on an 
assessment of the particular circumstance, if Respondent wants to leave the 
state.121 
All of the State’s monitoring and custody requests conformed to CDC interim 
guidelines for restricting movement of individuals with Hickox’s level of exposure 
to Ebola.122 
Before the hearing on the petition, Chief Judge LaVerdiere, sitting in Fort Kent 
District Court, issued a Temporary Order on October 30, 2014 (complying with 22 
M.R.S.A. § 811) requiring (1) Hickox’s submission to direct active monitoring; (2) 
coordination of her travel with public health authorities; (3) non-utilization of 
certain public transportation; (4) avoidance of public places; (5) avoidance of 
workplaces; (6) maintaining a 3-foot distance from others; (7) not leaving Fort 
Kent without consulting with public health authorities.123  Like the State’s 
requested relief, this Temporary Order substantially corresponded to the CDC 
Ebola guidelines. 
Seeking to enforce these extensive restrictions for the full 21-day incubation 
period, the State continued to argue that Hickox posed a significant public health 
risk.124  However, Chief Judge LaVerdiere lessened the restrictions of the 
Temporary Order in his Order Pending Hearing on October 31, 2014, citing 22 
M.R.S.A. § 811(3) (2014), that the court is authorized to “make such orders as it 
deems necessary to protect other individuals from the dangers of infection” 
pending a hearing on a public health order.125  LaVerdiere found that an order was 
necessary, but lessened Hickox’s restrictions to (1) direct active monitoring; (2) 
coordination of travel with public health authorities; and (3) immediate notification 
to public health officials upon development of any Ebola symptoms.126 
A final hearing on the State’s petition was never held.127  Though scheduled 
                                                                                                     
 121.  Petition, supra note 16, at 5-6.  
 122.  Id. at 5. 
 123.  Temporary Order at 1-2, Mayhew v. Hickox, (Me. Dist. Ct., Fort Kent, Oct. 30, 2014) 
[hereinafter Temporary Order]. 
 124.  The hearing was not open to the public and no transcript is available; therefore, the only 
assumption to be made is that the State continued to argue on the basis of the Verified Petition.  For the 
State’s arguments regarding the public health risk posed by Hickox, see Petition, supra note 16, at 1-5. 
 125.  Order Pending Hearing, supra note 17, at 18. 
 126.  Id. at 3. 
 127.  Judy Harrison, Kaci Hickox, State Agree to Make Temporary Order Permanent; Hearings This 
Week Cancelled, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, http://bangordailynews.com/2014/11/03/news/aroostook/kaci-
2016] MAYHEW V. HICKOX 277 
for November 4 and 5, 2014, Hickox reached an agreement with the State and with 
public health officials that would leave the restrictions established in the Order 
Pending Hearing in place through November 10, 2014, which would be the final 
day of her at-risk period.128  Thus ended her legal struggle, but the larger political 
and social ramifications, as well as media commentary, did not cease.129 
C.  The Fallout 
Despite the State’s recommendation for a much more restrictive order (based 
on CDC guidance) Hickox was essentially allowed to go free with simple 
monitoring and travel/symptom notification requirements.  Fort Kent residents, 
including business owners, were not hesitant to speak out about their dissatisfaction 
with the outcome of Hickox’s fight over her quarantine, though the town manager 
tried to put a positive spin on things.130  Hickox’s boyfriend, Ted Wilbur, withdrew 
from his nursing program, “accusing campus officials of failing to address concerns 
he had about returning to classes,” indicating that he had been warned about 
possible harassment and discrimination from other students (though he did not 
return to classes and did not actually claim to encounter any harassment or 
discrimination from classmates).131 
Speaking out about the ordeal, Hickox and Wilbur stood up for her actions, 
saying that it was “an act of civil disobedience” intended to force the State to get a 
court order, so that her liberties were not violated without following the letter of the 
law (as Hickox and Wilbur perceived the law).132  The two made the choice to 
leave Fort Kent and move to Southern Maine,133 and one need only conduct a straw 
poll on any morning in any Portland coffee shop to find a strong opinion about 
Hickox, her refusal to comply with CDC restrictions, and her subsequent move to 
Southern Maine. 
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V.  THE COURT’S FAILURE TO ENFORCE ADEQUATE RESTRICTIONS 
Under 22 M.R.S.A. section 810, clear and convincing evidence of an 
immediate public health threat is required in order for the District Court to grant 
temporary custody, emergency care, treatment, or evaluation.134  If temporary 
custody (or any of the other measures) are granted, another hearing is held within 
seventy-two hours for the court to determine whether custody shall continue.135  
Although the initial custody determination is at the court’s discretion, the next 
determination is not: If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
public health threat exists, the court shall order the “least restrictive measures 
necessary to effectively protect public health.”136  In the first custody 
determination, the District Court used its discretion to grant, nearly in full, the 
State’s requests for isolation and monitoring.137  However, in the second 
determination, it found only three restrictions necessary: (1) “Direct Active 
Monitoring” by CDC officials; (2) coordination of travel with public health 
authorities; and (3) immediate notification of public health authorities upon 
development of any symptoms.  Given the extreme risk posed by even minor 
exposure to Ebola, the questions are begged whether the court made the correct 
finding, and whether the burden of proof might be set too high by the controlling 
statute. 
A.  How the State Met the Burden 
Though it is difficult to say for certain without access to the full transcript,138 
the State seems to have met the burden in this case.  Chief Judge LaVerdiere 
certainly did not think so, emphasizing in his last order that “Respondent currently 
does not show any symptoms of Ebola and is therefore not infectious.”139  But his 
argument implies that he was considering only whether Hickox posed a current, at-
that-moment danger to the public.  Section 810, under which the court made its first 
Temporary Order, allows the court to order custody “in order to avoid a clear and 
immediate public health threat,” impliedly including an immediate future threat, 
which Hickox clearly posed.  But because the court did not give proper weight to 
the ramifications of a possible sudden onset of Ebola virus symptoms, the court did 
not place enough restrictions on Hickox’s freedom in its Order Pending Hearing. 
In the Temporary Order, Chief Judge LaVerdiere in fact granted seven of the 
State’s nine requests.  The only two not granted were the State’s requests (g), that 
Hickox discuss any plans for activities other than travel, work, and engaging in 
non-congregate public activities; and (i), that public health travel restrictions be 
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implemented if Hickox indicated a desire to leave the state.140  There was likely not 
any need to grant these two missing restrictions given the extent of the restrictions 
that were actually imposed, including daily MCDC direct active monitoring.  
Because Hickox was required by the Temporary Order to refrain from “any public 
places . . . or areas of congregate gatherings,”141 restrictions such as discussing 
plans for activities other than travel with public health authorities would simply 
place an additional burden on her that authorities know, in advance, where she 
might go and with whom she might have contact.  Combined with direct active 
monitoring, by which she would be checked twice daily for symptoms, such a 
restriction would seem to be excessive.  Similarly, because Hickox was under such 
close scrutiny by police and reporters, it is highly unlikely that she would be able to 
travel out of state without public health authorities’ immediate knowledge, 
rendering travel restrictions other than the one actually imposed (to refrain from 
public transportation)142 redundant. 
However, the court’s Order Pending Hearing eschewed many of the 
restrictions requested by the State, which, only days prior, the court had determined 
to be valid requests in the name of public health.  Chief Judge LaVerdiere retained 
requirements that Hickox engage in direct active monitoring, coordinate her travel 
with public health authorities, and added a new restriction: that she immediately 
notify public health authorities if any symptoms were to appear.143  The inclusion 
of this last restriction is particularly puzzling, because CDC guidelines for direct 
active monitoring includes that the affected individual “immediately notify the 
public health authority if [she] develop[s] fever or other symptoms.”144  The Order 
Pending Hearing thus eliminated three of the most crucial restrictions that the State 
requested—exclusion from public spaces and congregate gatherings; exclusion 
from workplaces; and maintaining a 3-foot distance from other persons—while 
inventing a redundant one.145 
If the court had placed appropriate weight on the State’s evidence, it could 
easily have imposed the missing restrictions.  The affidavit of Sheila Pinette, 
Director of Maine CDC, was the basis for the State’s entire petition, and laid out 
very explicitly why the entire list of CDC-guideline-based restrictions should have 
been granted.  Pinette specified that anyone “infected with Ebola virus can start to 
show symptoms of the disease (become infectious) at any point during the 
incubation period.”146  Pinette also pointed out that Hickox was most at risk for 
symptoms during the second week after her most recent exposure (October 20, 
2014), a time period that began October 28, 2014 – two days prior to the petition 
being filed; at the time of the court’s order, Hickox was most likely to develop 
symptoms and become infectious.147  Pinette noted that Hickox’s roommate in 
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Africa became infected with Ebola, without even knowing how.148  Further, 
Pinette’s affidavit stated that “nurses providing daily direct patient care are at 
greater risk and may require more precautions” than other care providers, and that 
Hickox had intensive, direct daily contact with Ebola victims.149   
At the time Hickox was battling the Temporary Order, she was at her highest 
risk of developing symptoms.  Symptoms could appear at any time, without 
warning, and be easily mistaken for a common cold or flu.  Transmitting bodily 
fluids – a simple sneeze or cut followed by a handshake, for example – could pass 
on her infection.  Based on the possible sudden onset of symptoms, Hickox’s level 
and timing of exposure, and the overall virulence of the disease, the court ought to 
have found that the State met the clear and convincing evidentiary burden.  Hickox 
posed a real, immediate threat to public health. 
It is questionable whether the clear and convincing evidence standard even 
applied in the Order Pending Hearing analysis.  Chief Judge LaVerdiere claimed to 
have decided the Order Pending Hearing under the operation of section 811(3), that 
the court “may make such orders as it deems necessary to protect other individuals 
from the dangers of infection.”  Unlike section 810, under which he granted the 
initial seven restrictions, there is no language in section 811 requiring that Hickox 
be an “immediate” threat or that the court make the determination under any 
evidentiary standard.150  Therefore it was purely the court’s assessment that she was 
not as significant a public threat as the State argued, and purely the court’s 
assessment that five restrictions granted by the Temporary Order be removed.  The 
court did note that if Hickox developed any symptoms at any point during her 
incubation period, it would “become necessary to isolate the Respondent from 
others to prevent the potential spread of this devastating disease.”151  Based on the 
information available in the Petition, Chief Judge LaVerdiere could have gone 
further with the restrictions. 
B.  Restrictions the Court Should Have Imposed 
Stricter measures ought to have been taken to ensure that the potentially 
infected Hickox did not come into contact with any members of the public.  While 
an infected individual is not infectious until presenting symptoms, Ebola symptoms 
present at first like the symptoms of many common maladies, and have a very 
sudden onset.  In this case, in which an individual had been exposed to a pathogen 
of extreme lethality and was going to be placed under quarantine measures for only 
twenty-one days, the public’s need to be safe from harm ought to have outweighed 
the individual’s liberty of movement. 
Removing one’s liberty for the greater public good is not a decision to be made 
lightly.  The situation of quarantine “raises unique questions: [h]ow are income, 
sustenance, and health care provided to a person in quarantine? Who cares for 
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children of those in quarantine?”152  But these questions were either not implied or 
moot in the instant case.  First, the quarantine was, and would have been temporary 
– only until 21 days had passed symptom-free, or she showed signs of the illness.  
Further, her boyfriend was with her, and she was under CDC direct active 
monitoring in her own home – not simply isolated in a prison or hospital.  
Therefore, the only remaining concerns were those of Hickox’s legal rights, which 
she had full opportunity to challenge in court.  As one scholar has written: 
[Q]uarantines that impose no gratuitous hardships and that are applied pursuant to 
orderly and non-discriminatory procedures are theoretically possible and also 
practically available. And such well-run quarantines, especially when they are 
employed to combat epidemic diseases, cannot plausibly be said to violate the civil 
rights of the quarantined. Even the staunchest civil libertarian must accept that one 
person's liberty may be restricted when this is necessary for preventing harm to 
another.153 
Further, the CDC guidelines require that shelter, food, and wage compensation 
be considered when imposing quarantine, and that “[p]ersons under public health 
orders should be treated with respect and dignity.”154  Hickox was not placed into a 
tiny, sterile box with minimal comforts as upon her initial arrival in New Jersey; 
nor was she held at gunpoint; nor forcefully restrained in any way: she was asked 
to comply with reasonable temporary restrictions on her travel and person-to-
person contact in order to avoid a potential Ebola epidemic, and allowed to remain 
within her own home with her live-in boyfriend. 
Hickox, as a health care provider herself, probably should have seen the ways 
in which her refusal to comply with the CDC immediately (that is, prior to the 
Order Pending Hearing) risked severe harm to the public.  She likely proffered 
similar arguments as the individual in Jacobson – that she posed no immediate 
threat, that there is no consensus on the best way to protect large populations from 
infection – but the differences are striking.  Jacobson involved a disease for which 
a vaccine was available.  Any citizen in Jacobson who failed to comply with a 
vaccine mandate would threaten herd immunity.  By contrast, Hickox’s apparent 
refusal to comply with quarantine measures threatened to infect a population with a 
disease against which there is no immunity, for which there is no cure, and against 
which there are no effective treatments.  There is little question that a temporary 
quarantine would be the most effective guarantee of public health in such a 
situation, but the court did not grant all of the measures that would prove most 
effective at preventing the spread of the disease. 
One author points out that “quarantines commonly compete with other 
methods of disease control,” including vaccination.155   Because there is no vaccine 
and no cure, the only guaranteed method of preventing infection from Ebola is 
isolation and preventing skin-to-skin or skin-to-fluid contact.  If the court found 
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that Hickox had the level of exposure to Ebola as claimed by the CDC,156 then, as 
the court noted, “Maine Law authorizes [the] court to make such orders as it deems 
necessary to protect other individuals from the dangers of infection.”157  The court 
ought to have found it necessary to uphold more of the restrictions from the 
Temporary Order, including avoiding public transportation, a ban from public 
spaces, and maintaining a 3-ft distance from other persons.  Only these measures 
would meet the safety needs of the public. 
C. A Burden Too Great to Bear 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “clear and convincing evidence” as 
“[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably 
certain.”158  As unhelpful as it is unspecific, this definition provides little guidance.  
Were it a simple matter of showing, with reasonable certainty, that infection of just 
one other person would occur based on even a minor interaction with Hickox, the 
District Court would likely have imposed several restrictions in addition to simple 
compliance with monitoring and alerts as to travel and symptom development.  But 
as discussed above, based on the State’s evidence, the court could have found that 
Hickox posed such a risk. 
The court was likely following the slightly more stringent standard as defined 
by the Law Court.  Recently, the Law Court defined clear and convincing evidence 
as “evidence that provides the fact-finder with an abiding conviction that the truth 
of the proponent’s contentions is highly probable.”159  Provided with this standard 
of proof it is easier to see, yet still difficult to fathom, how and why the court 
reduced Hickox’s restrictions.  Either Chief Judge LaVerdiere must not have been 
instilled with an “abiding conviction” that it was necessary to provide more 
restrictions than simply direct active monitoring, travel coordination with public 
health officials, and reporting the onset of any symptoms, or he was unconvinced 
that the State’s contentions were “highly probable.”  Other than the direct active 
monitoring, these restrictions amounted to little more than a phone call to state 
officials in the event that Hickox decided to leave Fort Kent or developed Ebola 
symptoms. 
While a high burden of proof ought to be associated with restrictions of 
personal liberties, especially freedoms of travel and association, it may prove too 
high a burden to actually do what it is supposed to do.  The statute, after all, is 
aimed at the protection of public health, and not the protection of personal liberties. 
Time and again, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld similar statutes restricting 
similar rights.160  Notably, the Jacobson Court did not define the sorts of cases in 
which personal liberties would be too infringed for the Court to invalidate a state 
law restricting individual freedoms when in conflict with public health or safety.161  
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In Jacobson, the Court said that it was “not prepared to hold that a minority . . . 
enjoying the general protection afforded by an organized local government, may 
thus defy the will of its constituted authorities, acting in good faith for all, under 
the legislative sanction of the state.”162  One could easily imagine that such is the 
result here.  Despite no actual harm having occurred, and keeping in mind that 
hindsight is 20/20, the guidance of the state authorities empowered to protect 
public health, as well as the various doctors and knowledgeable medical entities 
that created such guidance, seems to have been thwarted by an individual who 
disagreed on a personal level with her treatment under the law.  In such an instance 
it is easy to imagine that the evidentiary bar has been set too high, especially 
considering the weight of authority behind the one side of the argument, as well as 
the need for public safety. 
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard is “necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a 
variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved 
with a significant deprivation of liberty.”163  The Court has said that “the risk of 
error from using a [lesser standard] is substantial; and the countervailing 
governmental interest favoring that standard is slight.”164  However, in such 
instances, the Court typically balances the liberty of a single individual against 
another individual, or the liberty of a single individual against the government’s 
interest in depriving that individual of liberty.165  State v. Hickox, by contrast, 
represents the application of a statute that balances the liberty of an individual 
against the health and safety of an entire town, if not state, if not country.  Further, 
the Court has held that the clear and convincing evidence standard is appropriate in 
cases that deprive individuals of liberty indefinitely, whereas Hickox was under 
direct active monitoring in Maine for a mere two weeks. 
Finally, 22 M.R.S.A. section 812 provides that only the “least restrictive 
measures necessary” are to be issued as the final order for custody (or other 
protective measures).166  Perhaps the requirements that any final order of custody 
be under the least restrictive measures necessary to protect the public ought to be 
balanced with a lower standard of evidence, which would allow the court to assess 
those measures in a light more favorable to public safety.  Other Maine statutes use 
the clear and convincing standard, including: termination of parental rights 
proceedings,167 grounds for bail revocation,168 and removal proceedings for district 
attorneys.169  Just like the above-cited U.S. Supreme Court cases, these statutes 
require balancing the rights of an individual against governmental interests, or 
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balancing the rights of two individuals.  What these statutes do not require, unlike 
custody orders for the public health, is balancing the rights of an individual against 
the rights of the public. 
Especially when considering the potential risk of failure to prevent outbreaks 
of infectious diseases, quarantine measures become more attractive.  One scholar 
notes that the expected aggregate costs of quarantine are less than half of the 
expected aggregate costs of vaccination, and less than one quarter of the expected 
aggregate costs of failure to respond.170  As there is no vaccination alternative to 
Ebola, a simple cost-benefit analysis indicates that quarantine is the most 
economically effective solution.  Other scholars outright recommend strengthening 
isolation and quarantine laws, noting that “[u]nless draconian health screening 
techniques are routinely implemented at each port of entry . . . there will always be 
opportunities for people who are ill to cross our borders undetected.”171   
One way Maine could strengthen its public health law would be to remove the 
clear and convincing evidentiary barrier to isolation of individuals posing a public 
health risk.  Other states have less narrow requirements for creating quarantine.  
Alabama, for example, allows the governor, “whenever he deems it necessary,” to 
declare a quarantine, which is then enforced by the State Board of Health.172  And 
Texas, which has created a felony for quarantine violation,173 makes Maine’s 
current procedures look quite lenient.  Removing the clear and convincing burden, 
and replacing it either with purely discretionary language or with a standard or 
balancing test that more accurately reflects the interests at stake in quarantine 
cases, would help Maine protect the public from outbreak of infectious diseases 
such as Ebola virus. 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
Balancing public rights with private ones is a very difficult tightrope to walk, 
but it must be done on a daily basis.  In extreme cases, such as Mayhew v. Hickox, 
this tightrope is taken to the courts, which must decide whether and how much 
private liberty to restrict to achieve the goal of public health.  Maine’s statutory 
scheme presents a hurdle that, while not insurmountable, is not quite balanced in 
the public favor.  By requiring that a court impose the least restrictive measures 
necessary to protect public health, 22 M.R.S.A. § 810 and 812 at first blush seem to 
effectively balance the needs of the public and individual liberty, but closer 
examination shows that in some situations the result skews in favor of individual 
liberty at the expense of public health. 
The result is that an individual lawfully asserting his or her rights under 
sections 810 or 812 is unduly protected by the clear and convincing evidence 
standard, regardless of the level of threat that individual poses to the public.  In 
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Hickox’s case, she had the potential to spread one of the most contagious, most 
dangerous, and least treatable known diseases of the 21st century.  If Hickox had 
developed symptoms, which at the time was imminent, she could have potentially 
spread the disease in an isolated region poorly equipped to deal with the 
repercussions.  This is not to say that a doomsday-like scenario would necessarily 
have ensued, but until she passed the 21-day incubation mark, though daily testing 
negative for the virus, Hickox ought to have been considered infectious.  The clear 
and convincing evidence burden did not adequately account for the danger she 
posed to the public. 
Especially in the context of dangerous infectious diseases, Maine law should 
provide easier relief for DHHS to protect the public health.  Individual liberties are 
important, but the law should also consider the individual liberties of each and 
every other citizen to remain free from the harm that a single individual presents.  
“Response to emerging infections depends upon scientific evidence, but just as 
importantly, upon the values societies hold: how people live, how society is 
viewed, the balance of liberty, property, privacy rights, and individual autonomy 
with safety, security, and public health.”174  Mayhew v. Hickox represents a victory 
for individual rights, but a defeat for public safety, security, and health. 
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